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Politicians in Asia and some economists contend that developing countries are at
the mercy of the rapidly changing winds blowing from international capital
markets. We are indeed witnessing another episode of volatility in capital flows,
with foreign investors suddenly fleeing emerging markets in Asia. However,
speculative attacks are a symptom, rather than the cause of financial turbulences
and currency crises in developing countries. In the era of globalization, policy
consistency and government credibility have become still more important for
sustaining external financing. South Asia would be ill - advised to forgo the
benefits of capital inflows in order to avoid the risk of subsequent outflows.
Rather, South Asian governments should not repeat the economic policy failures
that are underlying the recent crises in Latin America and East Asia.
JEL classification: F20, F431
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Malaysia's Prime Minister, Mahathir Bin Mohamad, the verdict on
foreign investors in developing countries (DCs) is clear: DCs "can be suddenly
manipulated and forced to bow to the great fund managers who have now come
to be the people to decide who should prosper and who shouldn't.... Quite a few
people who are ... in control of the big money seem to want to see these South
East Asian countries and in particular Malaysia stop trying to catch up with their
superiors and to know their place. If they don't then they will just have to be
made to do so and these people have the means and the wherewithal to force their
will on these upstarts" (Mahathir 1997).
You may ask, of course, why these "hostile elements" were so eager to
participate in the previous economic boom by investing in East Asia and lending
money until recently. You may wonder still more why foreign investors were
allowed to engage in Malaysia in the first place, and why Asian leaders were not
complaining when they were receiving huge inflows of capital. In an interview
with the Times of India (on December 31, 1997), a prominent economist, Jagdish
Bhagwati suggests an answer to this kind of question: "Wall Street has become a
very powerful influence in terms of seeking markets everywhere. Morgan Stanley
and all these gigantic firms want to be able to get into other markets and
essentially see capital account convertibility as what will enable them to operate
everywhere .... Wall Street views are very dominant in terms of the kind of worldyou want to see. They want the ability to take capital in and out freely" (quoted as
in Wade and Veneroso 1998).
This seems to imply that DCs which complied with Wall Street demands by
opening up towards international capital markets have acted against their own
interest. Wade and Veneroso (1998) draw the logical conclusion: They argue that
high-saving Asian economies do not need foreign savings, and advise Asian
governments to close the capital account so that mobile capital cannot move
freely in and out. Once again, Bhagwati provides support: Capital markets "are
very volatile. Suddenly expectations can turn around. You may be very healthy
but suddenly you can catch pneumonia. ... Markets may do something when you
have done nothing wrong. ... I would put off capital account convertibility for
quite a while".
Bhagwati's assertions on volatility and changing expectations in international
capital markets are plain truth. Yet, much of the above reasoning amounts to
shooting the messenger of bad news. Moreover, it would become more difficult
for DCs in South Asia and in other regions to catch up economically with more
advanced economies if DCs were to reverse the course of opening up towards
international capital markets.
This proposition is substantiated in several steps in the following. First, I portray
recent trends in capital flows to DCs. Second, I present a more balanced account
on opportunities and risks of increased capital mobility for DCs. Third, I considervolatility in international capital flows to be a symptom, rather than the cause of
recent financial turbulences in Latin America and East Asia. Crises were caused
by inconsistent economic policies, lack of credibility and government-induced
incentive problems. Fourth, by reviewing the experience of South Asia, I show
that openness has been instrumental to economic catching up. Finally, I discuss
possible ways of limiting the risk of sudden capital outflows. I stress the role of
foreign direct investment (FDI) in sustaining external financing and in overcoming
financial crises.
II. FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS TO DCS
Foreign capital inflows are of increasing importance in DCs. Relative to GDP, net
resource flows to all DCs doubled in the 1970s (Figure 1). The subsequent
decline in this ratio can be attributed to the foreign debt crisis that hit particularly
Latin American countries in the first half of the 1980s. In 1996, however, the
ratio of net resource flows to GDP reached an unprecedented level of almost 5
per cent. FDI data underscore the improved attractiveness of DCs to foreign
capital. In 1994/95, FDI inflows accounted for 8 per cent of gross fixed capital
formation in DCs, about twice as much as in industrial countries (UNCTAD
1997). The share of DCs in worldwide FDI flows doubled from 17 per cent in
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Figure 2 portrays the development of capital flows to DCs from three major
sources since 1980. Stylized facts are as follows:
1
- External financing of DCs shifted from debt to equity finance. FDI inflows into
the 14 DCs considered in Figure 2 increased tenfold in 1980-1996. FDI
became the most important source of external financing in the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, the steadily rising trend suggests that FDI was least affected by
turbulence in international capital markets.
- Portfolio investment in DCs remained marginal throughout the 1980s. It soared
from US$ 0.6 billion in 1989 to US$ 90 billion in 1993. In contrast to FDI,
1 Note that data for 1996 are still incomplete; for details, see Figure 2.however, portfolio investment proved to be extremely volatile. The Mexican
peso crisis of 1994/95 was associated with a sharp fall in portfolio investment.
The sudden reversal of portfolio investment was most pronounced in Mexico,
but several Latin American economies, notably Argentina, suffered from
contagion.
Figure 2 — Capital Flows to DCs
a: FDI, Portfolio Investment and Other Investment
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aFlows to a group of 14 DCs (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Venezuela); 1980
without China and Indonesia; 1981 without China; portfolio investment liabilities without
Chile in 1980-1985; 1996 without Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. The group of
14 DCs accounted for 65 per cent of FDI, portfolio investment and other investment in all
DCs in 1993-1995.
Source: IMF (b).
- External financing through debt instruments (other investment liabilities in
Figure 2) turned negative in the second half of the 1980s. This was probably6
due to a combination of supply and demand factors. Foreign banks refused
further loans to debt-ridden DCs, and various DCs preferred equity over debt
finance. The situation changed in the 1990s when the significance of debt
instruments fluctuated heavily. Booming other investment liabilities in 1995 are
attributable to steeply increasing debt inflows into Brazil and some Asian DCs.
The latter financed rising current account deficits by short-term borrowing
abroad (see section IV.2).
Most recent data on foreign capital flows to DCs underline various of the above
findings.
2 Compared with 1996, net private capital flows to leading emerging
markets declined by one third to about US$ 200 billion in 1997. This decline is to
be attributed to financial turbulence in East Asia. The five major problem
countries in this region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and
Thailand), which had received capital inflows of more than US$ 90 billion in
1996, suffered capital outflows of US$ 12 billion in 1997. The East Asian crisis
did not cause a sudden reversal of capital flows to emerging markets in other
regions, which reported stagnating or even increasing inflows in 1997.
3
The reaction to the East Asian crisis differed significantly between major types
of foreign finance. FDI remained unaffected; FDI flows to all emerging markets
2 The subsequent data on net private capital flows to major emerging markets were
released by the Institute of International Finance in February 1998, and are
summarized in Quinlan (1998).
3 It is expected that capital flows to Latin America will decline by about US$ 15
billion in 1998. However, the projected inflows of US$ 75 billion to this region in
1998 would still be twice as high as inflows in IW5 (Quinlan 1998).7
continued to grow by about 20 per cent per annum, exceeding US$ 114 billion in
1997. By contrast, portfolio investment and bank lending revealed their volatile
nature once again. Portfolio equity investment in emerging markets was reduced
by about 40 per cent to less than US$ 20 billion in 1997,
4 The sudden shift was
even more pronounced with regard to commercial bank lending to emerging
markets, which was practically zero in 1997. Not surprisingly, this turnaround hit
particularly East Asian economies. The previous lending boom came to an abrupt
end, and these economies suffered debt-related capital outflows of US$ 21 billion
in 1997.
III. INCREASED CAPITAL MOBILITY: CATCHING UP UNDER
POLICY CONSTRAINTS
International capital mobility appears to be extremely high when looking at cross-
border financial flows. By contrast, real capital mobility is revealed by the
difference between investment and domestic savings, i.e., the current account
balance. Current account deficits rarely exceeded 5 per cent of DCs' GDP over
longer time periods. Econometric analyses pointed to de facto segmentation of
capital markets in the 1960s and 1970s (Feldstein and Horioka 1980). Domestic
savings have remained the key to investment in the 1990s. However, real capital
mobility has increased over time. Feldstein (1994) shows that the correlation
4 According to IMF (a), equity securities accounted for 31 per cent of "overall
portfolio investment liabilities of all DCs in 1994-1995; bonds and notes accounted
for more than two thirds, whereas the contribution of money market instruments
and financial derivatives to overall portfolio investment liabilities was marginal.coefficient between domestic saving rates and investment rates declined from
more than 0.8 in the 1960s to about 0.6 in the 1980s.
Relaxation of capital controls in various emerging markets is one important
factor underlying increased capital mobility. The European Round Table of
Industrialists (ERTI 1996: 7) identified a "general deregulation and liberalization
since the mid-80s in a tide of movement in many countries to make themselves
more attractive to foreign investment". Likewise, the IMF (1997a: Box 9)
reported a significant decline in an index of capital controls in emerging markets,
especially since the early 1990s. The (negative) correlation between this index
and capital inflows "provides some simple corroboration for the claim that
liberalization of external transactions has been instrumental in attracting foreign
capital" (ibid: 242).
Furthermore, recent analyses at the Kiel Institute of World Economics point to a
strikingly strong correlation between DCs' attractiveness to foreign capital and
their .economic growth performance. Gundlach and Nunnenkamp (1996) argue
that globalized capital markets have improved the prospects of DCs to catch up
economically with industrial countries. This view is supported by the following
observations:
- As noted before, DCs attracted more than a third of worldwide FDI in the mid-
1990s. At the same time, the regional distribution of FDI flows to DCs reveals
significant shifts between 1980 and 1996 (Figure 3). Most notably, LatinAmerica lost its top position in attracting FDI to East Asia.
5 The m/ra-regional
distribution of FDI flows changed as well. In Latin America, for instance,
Brazil suffered substantially impaired attractiveness; Argentina, Chile, Mexico
and some smaller economies increased their share in total Latin American FDI
inflows (for details, see Nunnenkamp 1997).
Figure 3 — Regional Distribution of (net) FDI Flows to DCs





EA: East Asia and Pacific (data on Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan not
reported in the source); LA: Latin America and Caribbean; SA: South Asia; SSA: Sub-
Saharan Africa; NS: not specified.
Percentage share in FDI flows to DCs except Middle East and North Africa; this region is
excluded because of negative (net) FDI flows in 1980. — bpre|jmjnary.
Source: World Bank (1997a).
- FDI shifts between and within regions are clearly related to economic policies
pursued by DC governments. Typically, early reformers with a favorable
record on macroeconomic stability, investment and human capital formation
The constant share of South Asia in Figure 3 obscures that this region's relative
attractiveness declined in the early 1980s and recovered thereafter, especially
since 1991; sec also section V below.10
gained FDI shares, whereas latecomers in reform (such as Brazil) lost FDI
shares.^
- DCs which proved to be attractive to foreign capital were successful in
catching up with industrial countries. The different experience of East Asia and
Latin America is most striking again. Per-capita income growth in the latter
region lagged considerably behind per-capita income growth in industrial
countries, whereas the former region reported an outstandingly favorable
growth performance (Figure 4). South Asia, too, caught up somewhat with








aAnnual average. — binding some newly industrializing economies with high per-capita
income.
Source: World Bank (1997b).
For a detailed discussion of the link between economic policy and attractiveness
to foreign capital, see, e.g., Gundlach and Nunnenkamp (1996) (for an inter-
regional perspective), and Nunnenkamp (1997) (for a Latin American perspective).11
industrial countries, though with less speed and from a fairly low level of per-
capita income. Similarly, the intra-Latin American pattern of attractiveness to
foreign capital is reflected in intra-regional growth differences. Chile, the
region's frontrunner in economic reform, was most successful in catching up
(Nunnenkamp 1997; 1998c).
I have dealt with correlations so far, and one may object that causation can run
both ways when considering attractiveness to foreign capital and economic
catching up. For example, various empirical investigations identified economic
growth as an important determinant of FD1. Yet, there is reason to believe that
openness towards international capital markets renders it easier to catch up
economically. Openness implies that investment in DCs is no longer constrained
by domestic savings. Higher investment, in turn, promotes labor productivity
growth and, thereby, allows for higher per-capita income. This is all the more so
as certain types of foreign capital inflows, notably FDI, offer more than just
capital. FDI tends to provide for managerial know-how, easier access to foreign
markets and, most importantly, access to internationally available technologies.
Technology transfers reduce the risk for DCs, which are still playing a marginal
role in generating technical progress, to fall behind technologically leading
economies.
Recent analyses support the view that openness is instrumental to achieving
high economic growth (Sachs and Warner 1995; Gundlach 1997). According to12
regression results of Gundlach (1997), open DCs converge to the steady-state at
a rate of about 5 per cent whereas closed DCs converge at a rate of about 1.5 per
cent. This confirms theoretical predictions according to which convergence rates
for open and closed economies should differ by a factor of about 2.5. Openness is
defined as in Montiel (1994), who used the Feldstein-Horioka approach of
measuring international capital mobility in a time-series context: DCs for which
the correlation between the investment rate and the domestic saving rate turned
out to be lower (higher) than 0.6 are considered to be open (closed).
These findings contradict the notion that, when opening up towards international
capital markets, DCs are complying with Wall Street demands and acting against
their own interest. However, openness involves risk. The risk of drawing on
foreign capital, in order to supplement domestic savings, is twofold. First, an
open capital account increases the impact of changes in world-market conditions
on DCs. High capital flows to Latin America in the early 1990s, for example,
were partly explained by external economic conditions, like recession in the
United States and low international interest rates (Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart
1992). The perceived "hot money" character of inflows raised several concerns at
that time already. Capital inflows may adversely affect the international
competitiveness of exports if they result in undesired real exchange-rate
appreciation, and deficient financial intermediation in recipient countries may
cause misallocation of capital inflows. Such risks are revealed once world-13
capital-market conditions change. Rising international interest rates may lead to
reduced inflows, or even capital outflows. Hence, access to foreign capital comes
at the cost of higher macroeconomic vulnerability of recipient countries.
Second, even if capital flows to all DCs as a group are sustained, individual
DCs with an open capital account may become the target of speculative attacks
(IMF 1997a: 33-35). Increased capital mobility constrains economic policy
choices in recipient countries. Policy failures have more serious consequences if
capital can move freely in and out. Especially if exchange-rate flexibility is
limited, individual DCs may be "tested" through a speculative attack on their
exchange rate, combined with an abrupt loss of market access, whenever
international capital markets are concerned about inconsistent macroeconomic
policies and structural weaknesses. Relatively high inflation and a weak fiscal
position can cause overvaluation of the domestic currency, which undermines the
government's credibility in defending the nominal exchange rate. Government
credibility is particularly low if short-term foreign indebtedness is high in relation
to international reserves. A weak domestic financial system adds to the risk of
changing expectations, particularly if financial institutions are heavily engaged in
financing long-term investment projects of dubious viability by drawing on short-
term foreign loans.
Blbliothek
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IV. THE ROLE OF DC GOVERNMENTS IN SUSTAINING EXTERNAL
FINANCING: VICTIMS OR CULPRITS?
Increased capital mobility has brought with it financial turbulence and currency
crises in Asia, Europe and Latin America. The subsequent short account of the
Mexican peso crisis in 1994/95 and the most recent turbulence in East Asia
reveals that international capital markets tend to overshoot. Nevertheless, these
episodes do not confirm Bhagwati's notion that "markets may do something when
you have done nothing wrong". Rather, these episodes support the view that
policy inconsistency and lack of government credibility are the cause of financial
distress, while international capital mobility can multiply the social costs of
government failure.
/. The "Tequila" Crisis
Mexico offers a telling example of boom and bust in capital flows. Far-reaching
stabilization and structural reform measures since the late 1980s encouraged huge
inflows of FDI, portfolio investment and debt finance (Table 1). Overall capital
inflows peaked in 1993 (US$ 37 billion). Ihe crisis erupted only one year later.
Overall capital flows turned negative in 1995, and recovered in 1996.
Volatility in overall capital flows to Mexico disguises different developments
for specific sources of external finance. FDI flows proved to be relatively stable;
FDI inflows in 1995 and 1996 remained significantly above inflows in the pre-
crisis year 1993. By contrast, portfolio investment that had contributed 77 per15
cent to overall capital inflows in 1993 turned negative in 1995. Even portfolio
investment comprises relatively stable elements (e.g., investment by pension
funds and life insurance companies); volatility in portfolio investment is mainly
due to the short-term profit orientation of managed investment funds (country
funds and mutual funds) (Langhammer and Schweickert 1995: 22).




















































It is plausible to argue that factors beyond the control of Mexican authorities
contributed to volatility. In 1991-1993, economic recession and low interest rates
in major industrial countries stimulated capital inflows into Mexico and other
DCs. Subsequently, economic recovery in industrial countries and rising interest
rates in the United States may have led portfolio investors to withdraw from
Mexico. Strikingly, however, portfolio investment in Asian DCs remained almost
as high in 1995 as in 1993 (IMF a).
7 Hence, there must have been something
7 Portfolio investment in Asian DCs jumped from US$ 8.3 billion in 1992 to US$
28.2 billion in 1993; in the three subsequent years, inflows amounted to US$ 26.4,16
specific that triggered the "tequila" crisis.
It is by now widely accepted that internal factors played a prominent role in
causing the crisis of 1994/95, which falls into the category of failed attempts at
exchange-rate-based stabilization.^ The reversal of capital flows was related to
rising concerns about the sustainability of large current account deficits. Real
exchange-rate appreciation impaired the international competitiveness of Mexican
industry.9 Capital inflows had been used mainly to finance a private consumption
boom, i.e., they had replaced domestic savings rather than supporting sustainable
economic growth. Hence, real exchange-rate appreciation was in conflict with
economic fundamentals.
The government's attempt to stabilize the nominal exchange rate was not
credible, even though Mexico implemented an impressive fiscal consolidation
program. Nominal devaluation was kept low while inflation inertia was quite
substantial. Policy inconsistency can be traced back to 1990, when the rate of the
crawl was lowered while monetary policy became more expansionary and the
labor market remained regulated. In early 1994, the Mexican peso was
considered to be overvalued by 20-35 per cent. Rumors were that the government
would have to revise its exchange-rate policy sooner or later. Such rumors tend to
27.5 and 36.6 billion, respectively.
For detailed assessments, see, e.g., Fischer and Schnatz (1996) as well as
Langhammer and Schweickert (1995); see also IMF (1997b: Box I).
In addition, political uncertainty mounted in Mexico in 1994 as a result of political
assassinations, social unrest and regional uprising.17
be self-fulfilling since investors withdrawing their funds in anticipation of
depreciation add to pressure on the local currency. The speculative attack
occurred in December 1994, and the peso lost about half its value within a few
weeks.
2. The East Asian Crisis
Similar to the Mexican peso in 1994/95, various East Asian currencies
plummeted in 1997/98. East Asian governments, too, had adopted a fixed or
quasi-fixed exchange-rate regime. They were forced to give up this regime,
although economic fundamentals seemed to be consistent with fixed exchange
rates until recently. Throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, East
Asia was given credit for high economic growth, sustained macroeconomic
stability, outstandingly high saving and investment rates, and favorable export
performance. At first sight, the contention that DCs are the victims of panicing
world capital markets appears to be more reasonable in the case of East Asia than
in the case of Mexico.
On closer inspection, however, the East Asian crisis bears resemblance to
previous crises in that government failure was the cause of overshooting market
reactions.
1
0 The risk of speculative attacks on East Asian currencies increased
when (trade-weighted) effective real exchange rates appreciated by about 10 per
1
0 The subsequent paragraphs draw on Diehl and Schwcickert (1998). Krugman
(1998b) and Nunnenkamp (1998a; 1998b).18
cent between early 1995 and mid-1997. An exogenous event, namely the
strengthening of the anchor currency, the US-dollar, against the yen and European
currencies, was underlying this development. Asian governments failed to
respond by allowing for more exchange-rate flexibility. Rising current account
deficits, and drastically reduced export growth rates in Malaysia and Thailand in
1996 fuelled market concerns about overvaluation. Current account deficits were
financed largely by short-term foreign borrowing. Mounting short-term debt,
which exceeded international reserves held by Indonesia, South Korea and
Thailand in mid-1997, undermined the governments' credibility with regard to
sustaining the fixed exchange-rate regime.
The outbreak of the crisis might have been postponed if governments had taken
timely measures to correct external imbalances. It is rather unlikely, however, that
such measures would have been sufficient to sustain economic growth and
financial stability in East Asia in the longer run. Serious internal financial
problems were ignored within and outside the region until recently. With
hindsight, today's problem countries were prone to crisis mainly because of the
fragility of domestic financial systems (Krugman 1998b).
Weak financial institutions extended credit without sound risk evaluation.
Excessive lending at high risk took different forms in the afflicted countries. In
Thailand, essentially unregulated finance companies borrowed short-term, often
in US-dollars, for long-term onlending to speculative investors. In this way,19
finance companies incited particularly booming real-estate investment, which
proved to be a huge speculative bubble later on. In South Korea, public
authorities directed banks to continue lending to industrial conglomerates for
investment projects of dubious viability. The common feature is that the risk
exposure of financial institutions was not controlled by effectively supervising
banks and by enforcing prudential standards according to international best
practice. To the contrary, financial institutions perceived their liabilities to be
guaranteed implicitly by the government.
It may be tempting to blame local financial institutions for having caused the
crisis by taking excessive risk, as well as foreign banks and investors for having
supported the financing of an unsustainable boom. However, government failure
is lying behind the institutional weaknesses and incentive problems that induced
moral hazard of financial institutions. Implicit government guarantees encouraged
risky lending until they had to be honored. The crisis deepened as soon as
financial institutions realized that guarantees were not credible. It turned out that
honoring guarantees would have been too costly for the government when asset
prices started to decline and vacancy rates in the real-estate sector increased.
Consequently, the failure of some large investors, who saw their profit
expectations frustrated, triggered a downward spiral. Financial intermediaries
stopped lending and tried to collect their claims, thereby reinforcing the decline in
asset prices. It was only then that East Asian currencies came under serious20
pressure. Foreign banks refused to roll-over outstanding loans or demanded
higher risk premia, which added to the calamity of local enterprises and
intermediaries. The latter tried to hedge liabilities by purchasing foreign exchange
at the spot market. As in previous crises, the expectation of depreciation proved
to be self-fulfilling. The brakes that could have prevented the crisis had been
removed long before, namely when the governments' failure in ensuring prudent
financial intermediation induced an unsustainable boom.
V. SOUTH ASIA: RECENT EXPERIENCE AND CURRENT
CHALLENGES
/. Openness, Capital Inflows, and Economic Performance
According to a survey on improvements in conditions for investment in the
developing world (ERTI 1996), South Asian economies have become
considerably more open since the mid-1980s. In 1987-1992, India and Pakistan
were among the six DCs which "stood at the forefront with their high speed of
opening". India remained on a "very fast track of opening" in 1993-1996, and was
considered to be "moderately open" at the end of 1996. The degree of openness
achieved by Bangladesh and Pakistan at that time was regarded to be somewhat
higher than that of India. Among South Asian economies, Sri Lanka ranked
highest with regard to the degree of openness ("quite open"), although the speed
of opening in 1993-1996 was "somewhat lower" in Sri Lanka (and in
Bangladesh).21
More welcoming attitudes towards FDI were part of "the broadly based
liberalization of South-Asian economies" (UNIDO 1996: 30). Major policy
changes were initiated in Sri Lanka in the late 1970s. Bangladesh and Pakistan
represent intermediate cases with regard to the timing of reforms in South Asia.
India was a latecomer to reform; some adjustment measures were launched in the
mid-1980s, but major reforms only started in 1991.
The process of economic opening was associated with a closer integration of
South Asia into the international division of labor, and with improved
attractiveness to foreign capital. The ratio of South Asian exports to GNP
increased from 5.4 per cent in 1970 to 10.5 and 13.6 per cent in 1990 and 1996,
respectively (World Bank 1997a). The ratio of (net) FDI inflows to South Asian
exports quadrupled from 0.8 per cent in 1980 to 3.4 per cent in 1996. Net
resource inflows (excluding grants) increased sixfold between 1970 and 1990,
and further doubled until 1996 (Figure 5). Relative to South Asia's GNP, net
resource inflows reached 2.6 per cent in 1996.
Net resource flows to the four major South Asian economies seem to be related
to the timing of economic liberalization. Comparing net resource inflows in 1970
with average annual inflows in 1994/95, the increase was most pronounced in Sri
Lanka, i.e., the frontrunner in reform (World Bank 1997a). Moreover, Sri Lanka
reported the highest ratio of net resource inflows to GNP in 1980 and 1990 (6.6
and 4.5 per cent, respectively). Bangladesh, which was the next reformer (in22
1983-1986), ranked second with 5.2 and 4.2 per cent, respectively. By contrast,
net resource inflows stagnated at about 1-1.5 per cent of GNP in India until 1990;
this ratio increased to 2.5 per cent in 1994, i.e., exactly when economic reforms
gathered momentum in India.
1'
Figure 5 — Net Resource Flows to South Asia
a, 1970-1996
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aSum of net flows of long-term debt (excl. IMF), net FDI, and portfolio equity flows; i.e.,
excluding grants. — ^Preliminary.
Source: World Bank (1997a).
FDI data provide further evidence for the link between economic liberalization
and attractiveness to foreign capital. Traditionally, South Asia was a minor host
of FDI (UNIDO 1996: 29). The region enhanced its attractiveness to FDI when
1' Net resource flows to India fell from US$ 7.3 billion in 1994 to US$ 2.7 billion in
1995, however; debt flows turned negative and portfolio equity flows declined,
whereas FDI flows doubled in 1995 (World Bank 1997a).23
major countries opened their economies. Average annual FDI inflows in 1987-
1991 were twice as high as in 1980-1986 (Table 2). FDI inflows increased
steadily from US$ 0.5 billion in 1991 to US$ 2.5 billion in 1995, which was
mainly because of rising FDI flows to reforming India.































Source: IMF (b); for India: World Bank Data Base (1980-1994); ADB (1997: Table A
17).
Openness and improved attractiveness to foreign capital, especially FDI, seem
to have helped better economic performance in South Asia. In the 1970s, when
all major economies were fairly closed, the region failed in narrowing the gap in
per-capita income between South Asia and more advanced economies; the gap
rather widened since South Asia reported slow growth of per-capita GDP of 1.3
per cent per annum (ADB 1989: Table A2). By contrast, the region achieved a
higher growth of per-capita GDP than industrial countries in 1985-1995 (2.9
versus 1.9 per cent; Figure 4). On the level of individual South Asian economies,
too, openness seems to have supported economic development:
- Bangladesh attracted only marginal FDI inflows (Table 2), although it is24
considered to be more open than India (ERTI 1996). Nevertheless, economic
reforms went along with higher growth of per-capita GDP.I
2 Economic
reforms supported a stronger world-market orientation of Bangladesh.
1
3
Favorable export performance was attributable to soaring exports of clothing in
the first place. The country's clothing industry benefited greatly from relocation
of production from economies like South Korea and Hong Kong. Especially
Korean companies transfered managerial and technical know-how to
Bangladesh. FDI data tend to understate the engagement of foreign companies
in the manufacturing sector of Bangladesh, since foreign involvement in the
clothing industry is frequently of a non-equity type such as subcontracting
(Nunnenkamp and Gundlach 1995).
India's share in FDI flows to South Asia in 1980-1986 was less than half its
share in the region's GDP and population (Table 2). India's FDI share increased
significantly exactly when economic liberalization gathered momentum. At the
same time, the ratio of exports to GDP that had remained stable at about 6-7
per cent throughout the 1980s increased to 10.6 per cent in 1993/94.
l
4 Per-
capita income growth amounted to 4.2 per cent per annum in 1992-1997,
compared with 2.8 per cent in 1987-1991 (ADB 1997).
1
2 Per-capita income increased by 2.6 per cent, on average, in 1992-1997, compared
with 1.7 per cent in 1980-1986 (ADB 1989; 1997).
1
3 The ratio of exports to GDP more than doubled from 5.8 per cent, on average, in
1980-1986 to 12.7 per cent in 1992-1997 (IMF b).
1
4 More recent data are not available from IMF (b).25
Pakistan is an exception in that openness was not associated with improved
economic performance. This country had been the most important host of FDI
within South Asia throughout the 1980s (Table 2). Absolutely increasing FDI
flows in the 1990s notwithstanding, Pakistan's FDI share declined to 35 per
cent in 1992-1995. At the same time, per-capita income growth declined from
about 3 per cent in 1980-1991 to slightly less than 2 per cent in 1992-1997.
Pakistan represented the taillight among major South Asian economies in terms
of catching up with industrial countries (Nunnenkamp 1998c). As it seems,
FDI in Pakistan contributed less to world-market orientation than elsewhere in
South Asia. Pakistan clearly performed poorest among the four economies
under consideration in terms of gaining world-export shares in 1980-1996
(IMFb).
Sri Lanka was most successful in catching up with industrial countries in 1980-
1995 (Nunnenkamp 1998c). This country was also most successful in
attracting FDI. FDI inflows were exceptionally high if accumulated inflows in
1980-1995 are related to population in 1995.
1
5 Sri Lanka's reduced share of
about 10 per cent in FDI flows to South Asia since 1987 (Table 2) was still
more than three times as large as Sri Lanka's share in South Asia's GDP. Yet,
Sri Lanka could possibly have achieved greater gains from openness if internal
1
5 In per-capita terms, FDI inflows into Sri Lanka amounted to US$ 57; Pakistan
ranked second with US$ 26 (sources as in Table 2).26
political conflict had not impaired its attractiveness to foreign capital. Political
uncertainty seems to be a major reason for the rather unstable pattern of FDI
inflows and economic growth.
1
6
2. The Risk Involved
All in all, South Asia seems to have benefited from economic liberalization and
greater openness towards international capital markets in recent years. However,
as argued in section III, openness involves the risk of being affected by adverse
capital-market developments. Current concerns are that financial turbulence in
East Asia may spread beyond the countries afflicted so far. Contagion may affect
South Asia in two ways. First, the East Asian crisis may induce foreign investors
to reconsider country risk in all emerging markets. This may cause a general shift
from generous to restrictive investment behavior in DCs; foreign investors would
then retreat into the few remaining "safe havens". Second, South Asia's access to
foreign capital may deteriorate if prolonged recession in East Asian problem
countries leads China to renege on earlier commitments not to devalue the
renminbi. In the case of a major devaluation in China, it would become more
difficult for South Asian suppliers to penetrate markets in which China is a major
competitor. Consequently, foreign investors would have weaker incentives to
engage in export-oriented production in South Asia.
16 FDI inflows were at a low ebb in the mid-1980s, in 1989, and in 1995 (IMF b).
Per-capita income growth declined from 3.5 per cent, on average, in 1980-1986 to
1.8 per cent in 1987-1991, but recovered thereafter (ADB 1989; 1997).27
A thorough discussion of alternative scenarios concerning East Asia's future
economic development and possible reactions of foreign investors, as well as a
detailed account of the various factors shaping country risk in South Asia would
be required in order to evaluate the significance of such fears. Section IV
suggests that financial market conditions in South Asian economies would
deserve particular attention in this context. This task is beyond the scope of this
paper. In the remainder of this section, I discuss just two factors which, as
previous crises reveal, are related to the issue of sustainability of capital inflows:
the structure of external financing and vulnerability to a reversal of short-term
capital flows.
An important caveat has to be kept in mind when interpreting the data presented
in Table 3. Figures for individual South Asian economies refer to 1995. Hence, it
is almost impossible to assess the present risk concerning the sustainability of
external financing.
1? Yet, Table 3 offers some interesting insights. First, FDI
contributed significantly less to net resource flows to South Asia than to net
resource flows to all DCs and East Asian DCs. This suggests that there is still
substantial scope for South Asia to improve the sustainability of external
financing, considering that FDI has typically been the most stable item of external
financing when capital-market conditions were unfavorable. Second, South Asia
The structure of external financing may change significantly every other year. For
example, FDI accounted only for 8 per cent of India's net resource inflows in 1994;
the share of portfolio equity flows and long-term debt amounted to 60 and 25 per
cent, respectively, at that time.28
as a whole compared favorably with East Asia and all DCs as concerns the
significance of short-term debt stocks. International reserves would decline by
less than 30 per cent, compared with 70 per cent for all DCs, if the roll-over of
short-term debt were to come to an abrupt and complete stop.
Third, Table 3 points to considerable differences between major South Asian
economies in terms of external financing risk. The situation appears to be most
critical in Pakistan. Short-term debt stocks exceeded international reserves,
revealing Pakistan's high vulnerability to a reversal of foreign capital flows.
Moreover, FDI and grants accounted for less than a quarter of net resource flows
to Pakistan in 1995.































































Source: World Bank (1997a).29
VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS
It is beyond serious doubt that international capital markets tend to overshoot
once profit expectations in emerging markets turn negative. Sudden shifts from
enthusiasm to panic, associated with the herding behavior of foreign investors,
repeatedly prevented a "soft landing" and exacerbated the social cost of economic
and financial tension in DCs. However, overshooting is a phenomenon prevailing
not only in international capital markets, but also in commenting upon acute
crises. Some politicians, like Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir, are blaming the
messenger of bad news. Ignoring that international capital markets are reacting to
changes in country risk, rather than being the cause of financial distress and
currency crises, may have tremendous costs: "Return to normalcy may be delayed
for a long time if leaders start looking for villains instead of solutions" (Krugman
1997: 34).
Some economists, too, have commented upon financial crises as if international
capital markets are doing DCs nothing good. The evidence presented above is in
strong conflict with the contention that openness of DCs towards international
capital markets is exclusively in Wall Street's interest. Rather, open DCs have
better opportunities than closed DCs to catch up economically with industrial
countries. The recent experience of South Asia fits into this picture. It follows
that Wade and Veneroso's (1998) suggestion to close the capital account, in order
to avoid being at the mercy of volatile capital markets, amounts to shooting in30
one's own feet:
- The opportunity costs of closing the capital account may be large even for the
high-saving East Asian economies afflicted by the current crisis. Especially
capital transfers in the form of FDI provide benefits in terms of managerial
know-how, easier access to foreign markets and access to internationally
available technologies, i.e., factors that help overcoming the crisis and
resuming the process of catching up. Moreover, acquisitions by foreign
investors limit the decline in asset prices. This implies that "the mere potential
for FDI may act as a stabilizer against the risk of domestic financial panics"
(Krugman 1998a: 9).
- DCs with rather low domestic saving rates are likely to suffer particularly high
opportunity costs when closing the capital account. In contrast to various East
Asian economies whose domestic savings accounted for about 35 per cent of
GNP in 1996, South Asia is in greater need to supplement domestic savings by
foreign capital inflows. In 1996, domestic saving rates were in the range of 12-
16 per cent in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; among major South Asian
countries, only India reported a substantially higher saving rate (27 per cent)
(ADB 1997: Table A7).
For DCs which do not want to forgo the benefits of capital inflows, the
challenge is to reduce the risk of being affected by volatility in international
capital markets. Recent crises offer some lessons in this respect (see also Diehl31
and Schweickert 1998). First, DCs can prevent speculative attacks on their
currencies by adopting a flexible exchange-rate regime and, thereby, denying
speculators a fixed target. Second, this task is more demanding for DCs using the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor for internal stabilization purposes.
International capital markets may question the credibility of the government's
commitment to a particular exchange rate for various reasons. Third, it follows
that DCs should avoid repeating the policy failures that caused previous crises,
rather than blaming international capital markets for internal economic and
financial problems.
Credibility must be ensured on several fronts. Speculative attacks are most
likely if monetary and fiscal policy is inconsistent with a fixed exchange-rate
regime. However, it is not sufficient to avoid obvious macroeconomic
inconsistencies. International capital markets may also turn their back on DCs, if
rising real interest rates, high unemployment and low economic growth feed
expectations that the government will change course and devalue in order to
resolve internal economic problems.
Furthermore, the sustainability of external financing is at risk as long as major
institutional weaknesses persist and domestic financial markets remain essentially
unregulated. Financial institutions must be supervised effectively, prudential
standards should be in line with international best practice and must be enforced,
and governments must not create expectations that private sector liabilities are32
guaranteed. Effective regulation of domestic financial markets is essential
particularly in the early phases of financial liberalization.
Finally, the structure of external financing matters for reducing the risk of a
sudden reversal of capital flows. In order to avoid excessive reliance on short-
term financing and improve the management of foreign debt, lenders and
borrowers need timely and comprehensive information on outstanding liabilities.
This calls for improved data collection and data dissemination, both domestically
and internationally. Among the different sources of capital inflows, FDI has
typically proven to be the least volatile item. Hence, DCs should aim at a high
share of FDI in overall external financing. The stabilizing properties of FDI help
DCs in the midst of financial turbulence to limit the depth of the crisis. For other
DCs, a strong reliance on FDI reduces the risk of contagion. All DCs attracting
FDI have better chances to catch up economically with advanced economies
since FDI provides for more than just capital.33
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